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TAB A

THE PROBLEM

To determine the intelligence effort which should be undertaken to assure that the Department of State is provided all possible and reasonable support in the development of technical intelligence where-with to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.

DISCUSSION

The VOA is undertaking an extensive program to penetrate Soviet jamming of its Russian language broadcasts beamed to the USSR. To this end the Department of State requires (1) all possible intelligence on Soviet jamming operations and techniques and (2) the best available technical research and recommendations on further measures that may be taken to penetrate Soviet jamming. Although the Department has received some useful data from intelligence sources, this data has not been sufficient to meet the present need, nor does it appear to represent the complete body of data which has been available among the intelligence agencies.

An adequate intelligence effort in support of the VOA would require:

- (1) A program to allocate this effort among all available monitoring facilities and to assure close, daily co-ordination in the use of these facilities.
- (2) A coordinated program among the intelligence agencies to collect and associate relevant data from non-monitoring sources.
- (3) Agreement among the intelligence agencies that this program should be undertaken as a matter of high priority.
- (4) The establishment of direct, secure channels to pass data to the Department of State.
- (5) Provision whereby this data may be used and evaluated on a daily basis by the International Broadcasting Division (IBD) and the VOA.

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Present arrangements to provide intelligence support for the VOA have developed as follows:

- (1) NSC-4 provides that the departments and agencies concerned should insure the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate facilities for the implementation of approved foreign information policies. There was established an Interdepartmental Consultative Group for Coordination of Foreign Information Measures under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, and the Department of State was designated as implementing authority in this field. The Central Intelligence Agency was charged with responsibility to coordinate the collection and evaluation of relevant intelligence. These recommendations of NSC-4 were approved by the President in December 1947.
- (2) Soviet jamming of the VOA commenced in February 1948. From that time until July 1949, IBD attempted to obtain information on Soviet jamming through its connections with the various government operating agencies in the field of communications and through its participation in the Interdepartmental Consultative Group.
- (3) At a meeting of the Interdepartmental Consultative Group on July 6, 1949 the question of providing coordinated intelligence support for the VOA was discussed in detail. The following steps were taken as a result of this meeting:
 - (a) The CIA assumed responsibility to provide coordinated intelligence support, and the Department of State indicated to the DCI the specific types of technical data which it required.
 - (b) The CIA undertook to collect and evaluate this data.
 - (c) The Department of State forwarded letters to the Department of Defense and the Federal Communications Commission requesting their support for the coordinated effort to be undertaken by the CIA.

Recent developments in Soviet jamming have increased the urgent need for timely data on new Soviet equipment and techniques. It is now clear that the steps taken since July 1949 to provide intelligence support in this field have not been sufficient to meet these developments. This appears to have been due primarily to lack of agreement among the

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intelligence agencies as to the degree of priority necessary to undertake this effort successfully and the particular type of closely-knit effort required. It has become apparent that the VOA problem cannot be considered apart from other problems of communications research, counter-measures and development which face the Government as a whole, and that each of these problems places heavy demands upon scarce intelligence facilities. The question of intelligence support for the VOA effort to penetrate Soviet jamming must be considered in relation to the intelligence support required in the fields of counter-jamming and anti-jamming. There is also the possibility that the VOA may represent a security hazard to our communications in the event of war by exposing prematurely the development of U. S. techniques and capacities to penetrate jamming.

Inasmuch as the emphasis to be placed upon the VOA problem in relation to other problems in the communications field has not been determined, the Department of State is preparing to submit the broad question of relative priorities among communications problems to the National Security Council and to request that the NSC (1) establish the degree to which the technical communications effort to penetrate Soviet jamming should be undertaken and (2) indicate the relative priority in the field of intelligence necessary to support this effort. Pending the determination of NSC policy in these matters, the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, has requested that the intelligence agencies establish an appropriate interim effort to meet the immediate needs of the VOA. This interim effort would also serve as a means to explore the capacity of existing intelligence facilities to undertake a broader program should the NSC so decide. At present there appear to exist among the intelligence and monitoring agencies adequate facilities to undertake the interim effort which has been requested.

CONCLUSIONS

The present intelligence effort in support of the VOA is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Department of State.

The full extent to which intelligence facilities should be committed to support VOA cannot be determined until the NSC has established the relative priority of the VOA problem in relation to other problems in the field of communications research, counter-measures and development.

Pending determination of such a policy, the IAC agencies should undertake an interim intelligence effort as requested by the Department of State. This effort should be organized within the framework of existing facilities. It should not be out of proportion to other priority

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intelligence tasks, nor should it be permitted to jeopardize the security of intelligence sources. It should also serve to explore the particular type of effort and the extent of facilities which would be required, should a broader program be required in the future.

The facilities to commence this effort are available among the existing intelligence and monitoring agencies.

The CIA should continue its responsibility to establish a coordinated program in this field and to collect and evaluate relevant technical data. This program should also provide that data may be passed directly and promptly to the Department of State for evaluation and use on a daily basis by IBD and the VOA. The establishment of such an interim program would require the active support of the IAC agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the DCI, with the full support of the IAC agencies, immediately initiate a project to assemble, collate, and evaluate currently available technical data required for the VOA operation.
2. That, in addition to (1) above, an ad hoc committee of the IAC be established to consider and recommend to the IAC, within one month, an interim and exploratory program for technical intelligence support of the VOA, to be carried out pending an NSC decision as to the relative priority of the VOA problem. This program should provide for:
 - a. Use and allocation of monitoring facilities of the IAC agencies and, if advisable, the FCC;
 - b. Appropriate request to USCIB for use and allocation of AFSA facilities;
 - c. Use of existing intelligence resources in the collection and collation of data from non-monitoring sources;
 - d. Establishment of special channels, where necessary, which will provide for transmittal of pertinent technical data directly and promptly to IBD and which will insure that the security of sensitive intelligence sources is maintained. (This ad hoc committee should be composed of representatives of CIA (Chairman), State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. It should receive the full support of the IAC agencies in terms of access to the information required or additional personnel to serve on working groups.)

3. That any request for AFSA support under (2 b) above be

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TAB B

INFORMATION NEEDED ON SOVIET RADIO JAMMING

- (A) Information tending to show extent to which real purpose or purposes of jamming may be:
 - (1) Experimentation, or a screen for experimentation, directed toward possible disruption of other forms of civil and military telecommunications, air navigation devices, etc.
 - (2) As a defensive weapon against guided missiles.
- (B) Number of jamming transmitters, including such data as:
 - (1) Number in operation at a given time;
 - (2) Total number of individual transmitters which have been used during some given period such as a day, week or month;
 - (3) Total number of transmitters believed to be available to them for use at a given time.
- (C) Characteristics of these transmitters including:
 - (1) Power;
 - (2) Form of emission, i.e. amplitude or frequency modulation or pulse, frequency of modulation swing, pulse rate and pattern;
 - (3) Peculiar identifying characteristics of waveform, if any;
 - (4) Equipment data such as types, foreign or Russian design, tube types used, special design features.
- (D) Location and grouping of each jamming transmitter, i.e., geographical coordinates of each source of jamming and the number of sources at each location and whether there are operating relationships between jammers at the same location.

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- (E) Whether the jammers are mobile, portable, or fixed and if portable, whether self-contained as regards power supply; means of portability.
- (F) Types and directivity of antennas, such as:
 - (1) Antennas for ground-wave jamming or antennas for sky-wave jamming;
 - (2) Omni-directional or directional antennas and estimate of power gain;

(A pattern of field intensity measurements combined with direction finding may make it possible to estimate the general characteristics of an antenna being used.)
- (G) Methods of operation:
 - (1) Authority under which jamming is conducted, whether by Ministry of Telecommunications, armed forces, internal security policy, party propaganda organs, etc.;
 - (2) Overall pattern of coordination and synchronization under which jamming is conducted;
 - (3) Mechanics of coordination and synchronization in terms of communications between jammers, monitoring points and directing authority;
 - (4) Intelligence base upon which jamming operates, e.g., monitoring, other sources.